Site

my.gov.au

Baseline visit
Requested address
https://my.gov.au/
Report ID
20260928-13ab437198eeab65a8891a623dcf8de8
Evidence SHA-256
2a1175479dd4393e7d98290af0a05ed8d54122ee707e3fddce99837f28b2ae6b
Scanner
playwright-chromium

In the visit labeled No blocking, 3 requests matched Brave Shields filter lists.

Where this page's requests went

Both visits. One mark is one request row in the retained log.

No blocking

my.gov.au itself60 requestsrequests that stayed on the site
Catalogued services0 requestsno retained request matched the service catalog
Hosts the catalog does not name2 requests2 hosts; the catalog cannot say who operates them

Brave-list blocking

my.gov.au itself57 requestsrequests that stayed on the site
Catalogued services0 requestsno retained request matched the service catalog
Hosts the catalog does not name2 requests2 hosts; the catalog cannot say who operates them
Not measuredabsence here is not evidence of absence
  • Other pages on this site
  • Signed-in visitors, other browsers and other regions
  • Anything that loads only after interaction or consent
  • Services the catalog does not name
  • one request on record, same site
  • one request on record, cross-site
  • not measured

3 requests matched while loading normally. This run records no evaluated-request count, so no match ratio is stated. Matching identifies traffic the lists would target; it does not establish the purpose or payload of an individual request.

2cross-site domains
2cross-site requests

Worth checking

Bottom line: this visit has signals worth checking

The scan observed signals a non-expert should not have to decode from raw request tables.

Where severity is ranked, the cohort is a curated set of popular, mostly commercial sites, not a random sample of the web. Details

The cards below translate the evidence into plain language. Where a measured distribution exists, severity ranks this visit against percentiles from this report's cohort, with each percentile card naming its metric-specific measured-site denominator; otherwise it uses fixed reference thresholds. That cohort is drawn from a curated set of popular, mostly commercial sites, not a random sample of the web. The request log, domain table, and methodology remain below for verification.

62 requests observed in one controlled visit.

What was checked

Page
https://my.gov.au/
When
Sep 28, 2026, 3:46 PM UTC
Setup
Both visits used headless Chromium in a desktop window of 1440 × 980, with en-US language and UTC time zone. Both ran from a GitHub Actions Ubuntu runner; the network region was not recorded. Neither sent the Global Privacy Control (GPC) signal.
Visits
Two visits configured to differ in Brave-list blocking: No blocking and Brave-list blocking.
Interactions
No typing was recorded in either visit. No scrolling, clicking or consent interaction.
Outcome
Both visits completed.

What these visits could not see

  • Other pages on this site. Only the requested page's activity was recorded.
  • Signed-in visitors, other browsers and other regions. Both visits were automated, from a fixed en-US / UTC profile. Sites can behave differently for real users, browsers, regions, accounts, or network locations.
  • Anything that loads only after interaction or consent. Trackers that load that late are not observed, so counts are a lower bound.
  • Services the catalog does not name. Service labels use a US-biased hand-curated catalog, so regional services may be under-labeled.

Context

3 requests matched Brave Shields filter lists

3 requests matched the default filter lists of Brave Shields, the ad and tracker blocker built into the Brave browser, while loading normally.

Blocking can also prevent follow-on requests, so this number is neither a measured block count nor what a Brave visit would block. Details

Computed with Brave's own ad-block engine and default filter lists in classification mode: matched requests were not blocked by the scanner and remain in this report's observed request counts. This is Site Behavior Lab's list-based simulation, which applies every list to the site's own requests too. Brave's default Standard setting skips most of these lists for such requests, so its results can differ.

The hand-curated service catalog separately matched 0 request rows in this visit.Show matched requests

Low signal

No change observed in the Brave-list blocking attempt

The blocking visit ran with the scanner configured to apply Brave's ad-block engine and default Shields filter lists. It was a simulation in this scanner's browser, not a live Brave-browser visit, and application was not verified. Compared with the unblocked visit, it showed no change in the comparable metrics (third-party requests, third-party cookies and tracking-related service requests).

Treat this as no observed difference for this pair of visits, not evidence that blocking removes nothing. Details

The blocking visit's engine directly blocked 3 requests. Ad rotation, experiments, or caching between the two visits can offset or outweigh what blocking removed, which is how totals can hold steady or rise despite direct blocks. A single paired comparison can also reflect run-to-run variance (ad rotation, caching, experiments).

Signed per-metric differences between the two visits; nothing is summed across metrics.Show matched requests

Worth checking

1 first-party DNS alias matched tracking checks

Of the resolved targets, 1 matched Brave filter lists; those matches do not identify the operators.

These matches do not establish a request's purpose, profiling, or an intent to conceal tracking. Details

The scanner followed DNS CNAME chains from first-party subdomains and checked resolved targets against the service catalog and Brave filter lists. A filter-list match alone is not a verified service identity or proof of tracking.

DNS alias: *.my.gov.au → *.*.*.*.adobedc.net (Brave filter-list match; operator unverified).Open domain evidence

Context

Other third-party operators were identified outside the tracking-service catalog

Google was named by consent-platform signatures, reviewed ownership, or CNAME evidence without being classified as a tracking service.

Operator identity and tracking classification are separate: naming an operator does not prove that a request was for tracking. Details

This scan identified an operator for every one of the 2 third-party domains recorded here using catalog, consent-platform, reviewed-ownership, and CNAME evidence.

2 cross-site requests across 2 third-party hosts.Below the median for third-party domains across the 85 sites measured for this metric.Show third-party requests

Context

Requests were dispatched to major-platform domains the catalog does not carry

This visit dispatched requests to Google domains that the reviewed ownership map names, though the service catalog carries no entry for them.

Asset and font hosts reach this state often: the ownership map establishes who operates the domain, and nothing here establishes the request's purpose or payload. Details

These domains are not counted as catalog-matched requests.

2 cross-site domains seen overall.Show catalog-matched requests

Not flagged

No Google Analytics observed

This visit did not contact Google Analytics.

This does not prove the site never uses Google Analytics; it means this visit recorded no request to it. Details

Neither Google Analytics nor its remarketing sync was observed in this visit.

No google-analytics.com, analytics.google.com or googletagmanager.com requests.Show catalog-matched requests

Not flagged

No third-party cookies observed

The automated visit did not observe third-party cookies.

This does not prove the site never uses cookies; it means this visit did not observe third-party cookies.

3 cookies total in this report.No third-party cookies observed.

Not flagged

No fingerprint-like API calls observed

The scan did not observe the instrumented high-entropy browser APIs.

This is an observation layer, not proof that fingerprinting is impossible.

0 API families recorded.

Scan report ready for my.gov.au: 62 recorded request rows.

Comparison ReportOlder format: some facts reconstructed, descriptive only

Brave-list blocking off/on comparison

Recorded final address https://my.gov.au/ (opens in a new tab)
ShareDownloads the No blocking visit's request CSV, source report and correction context in a ZIP. Follows the evidence switcher below.PDF + evidence (opens in a new tab)Downloads a ZIP containing the PDF for every recorded visit, exact source JSON, correction context and file hashes. The scanner renders it on request.

Brave Shields Comparison

No blocking → Brave-list blocking delta

No blocking: started Sep 28, 2026, 3:46 PM UTC · 2,858msBrave-list blocking: started Sep 28, 2026, 3:46 PM UTC · 8,625msRan first: No blocking
Some deltas are not comparable across these two visits and are not shown.
  • Other detector and causal-path deltas (each visit's own evidence still renders below): v1 never recorded detector versions, so fingerprinting and pixel deltas cannot be proven to come from matching instrumentation.
  • The Shields-number delta (each visit's own evidence still renders below): The two visits measured different Shields quantities (filter-list matches vs engine-blocked requests), which must never share a delta.
  • Fingerprinting deltas (each visit's own evidence still renders below): v1 never recorded detector versions, so fingerprinting and pixel deltas cannot be proven to come from matching instrumentation.
  • Ad-pixel deltas (each visit's own evidence still renders below): The record of the No blocking visit does not hold this measurement. The record of the Brave-list blocking visit does not hold this measurement.
Requests-3No blocking: 62 · Brave-list blocking: 59
Third-party requests0No blocking: 2 · Brave-list blocking: 2
Third-party domains0No blocking: 2 · Brave-list blocking: 2
Cookies-3No blocking: 3 · Brave-list blocking: 0
Third-party cookies0No blocking: 0 · Brave-list blocking: 0
Storage keys-1No blocking: 6 · Brave-list blocking: 5
Catalog-matched requests0No blocking: 0 · Brave-list blocking: 0

Every signed change is Brave-list blocking minus No blocking. A positive or negative direction is descriptive, not a judgment that the result is better or worse.

Cookie and storage count deltas include every observation. Name-level lists show only reviewed names; unreviewed names are not itemized because they can contain identifiers.

Largest per-domain request-count changes

*.my.gov.aufirst partyNo blocking: 3 · Brave-list blocking: 0Show No blocking requests · Show Brave-list blocking requests-3

Domains only with Brave-list blocking

No domain changes observed.

Domains only with No blocking

*.my.gov.auunlabeled · Show No blocking requests3

Visible cookie names only with Brave-list blocking

No visible cookie-name changes to show; privacy-filtered names are not itemized.

Visible cookie names only with No blocking

No visible cookie-name changes to show; privacy-filtered names are not itemized.

Visible storage keys only with Brave-list blocking

No visible storage-key changes to show; privacy-filtered keys are not itemized.

Visible storage keys only with No blocking

No visible storage-key changes to show; privacy-filtered keys are not itemized.

Entities only with Brave-list blocking

No entity changes observed.

Entities only with No blocking

No entity changes observed.

Measurement limits

7 conditions affect how this evidence reads

This report

  • Brave-list blocking comparison runs should be collected under matched crawl conditions, and the blocking run is a simulation with Brave's engine and default lists in this scanner's browser, not a live Brave visit. Differences can still reflect timing, experiments, cache state, consent state, or bot detection.
  • The two visits ran in randomized order; the "No blocking" visit ran first.

Both visits

  • Each visit in this report is one automated, headless Chromium visit from a fixed en-US / UTC profile, with no scrolling, clicking, or consent interaction. Sites can behave differently for real users, browsers, regions, accounts, or network locations.
  • Counts are a lower bound: trackers that load only after interaction or consent are not observed; Service Workers are blocked, and Web Worker or WebSocket traffic may be incomplete. Service labels use a US-biased hand-curated catalog, so regional services may be under-labeled. Cookie and storage figures are an end-of-visit snapshot, with storage keys read from the top frame only.

No blocking visit only

  • Resolved 1 first-party subdomain that is a CNAME alias for a third-party tracker (CNAME cloaking), which request-URL matching alone would miss.

Brave-list blocking visit only

  • Brave Shields block simulation was enabled; matching requests were aborted before loading and are not included in request totals.
  • The page did not reach network idle before the scan window ended.

This versioned report is currently retained in the public corpus. Follow the currently retained site history, repeat the same public route when it is available, or request a transparent evidence correction.

Report ID
20260928-13ab437198eeab65a8891a623dcf8de8
Site
my.gov.au
Latest visit
Schema
v1 schema · facts legacy-derived · descriptive report
Verify recorded provenance

Baseline visit

Started
Run quality
complete; derived from status and warnings
Scanner
playwright-chromium
Browser
153.0.8010.12
Redaction
not recorded by this schema
Provenance
Exact build and instrument digests were not recorded by this legacy schema.

Variant visit

Started
Run quality
complete; derived from status and warnings
Scanner
playwright-chromium
Browser
153.0.8010.12
Redaction
not recorded by this schema
Provenance
Exact build and instrument digests were not recorded by this legacy schema.

Recorded provenance is self-reported measurement metadata, not a cryptographic attestation. The public versioned report JSON contains the retained public evidence; see the methodology for interpretation and retention limits.

This report covers what the scanner measures, not everything a site can do. 17 browser surfaces are not instrumented at all (Every page except the one that was scanned; Anything that only loads after scrolling or interaction; Why a request happened, as a causal chain; and 14 others), 3 capabilities are declined by policy, and 3 are outside what any single visit can see. Their absence from this report is not evidence that they did not occur. Read the published coverage boundary.

Detector accuracy is unmeasured. No calibration study currently publishes a precision or recall for the detectors on this page, so a detector match here is a recorded observation, not a calibrated classification. How detector accuracy is measured.

Approved use boundary: This report is investigative evidence that requires independent corroboration. It is not a standalone legal determination and not the sole exhibit in a legal proceeding. Recorded in this project's release manifest on .