cut short: fingerprinting evidence was censored before completion — the in-page fingerprint observer did not finish (recorded loss count: 1); recorded by the scanner
SBL-CORR-2026-001: The historical input-probe disclosure overstates coverage. Unload-only transmissions were not reliably recorded. Focus and blur handlers could run, and per-field failures were not fully counted. These reports cannot establish absence of input transmission outside their retained observations.
Incomplete evidence: evidence was cut short before completion (fingerprinting evidence was censored before completion — the in-page fingerprint observer did not finish (recorded loss count: 1); request evidence was censored before completion — the producer recorded an additional collection loss (recorded loss count: 2)). Counts for the affected evidence are lower bounds; families that completed carry only their ordinary limits. The evidence receipt states the exact per-visit quality.
What this actually means
cvs.com contacted catalogued Google and Microsoft domains during this visit.
SBL-CORR-2026-001: The historical input-probe disclosure overstates coverage. Unload-only transmissions were not reliably recorded. Focus and blur handlers could run, and per-field failures were not fully counted. These reports cannot establish absence of input transmission outside their retained observations.
The scan observed signals a non-expert should not have to decode from raw request tables. Some detector evidence was incomplete; each affected detector card states its own retained or unavailable scope, while completed request, cookie, and storage measurements keep their recorded exactness.
The cards below translate the evidence into plain language. Where a measured distribution exists, severity ranks this visit against percentiles from the report's exact schema, methodology, tracker-catalog, ServiceRole-taxonomy, metric-contract, producer, and Global Privacy Control cohort, with each percentile card naming its metric-specific measured-site denominator (among 98 sites with a successful load across all cohorts; other methodologies, request-capped visits, and post-choice consent visits are excluded from this denominator, while failed or block-page attempts are outside that coverage), a curated set of popular, mostly commercial sites, not a random sample of the web, and otherwise uses fixed reference thresholds. The request log, domain table, and methodology remain below for verification.
282 requests observed in one controlled visit.
Worth checking
68 of 268 requests the engine evaluated matched Brave Shields filter lists
68 requests matched the default filter lists of Brave Shields, the ad and tracker blocker built into the Brave browser, while loading normally.
Computed with Brave's own ad-block engine and default filter lists in classification mode: matched requests were not blocked by the scanner and remain in this report's observed request counts. Matching shows what Shields would target on this visit's traffic; an actual Shields visit blocks these and also prevents their follow-on requests, so this number is neither a measured block count nor the total effect.
The hand-curated service catalog separately matched 59 request rows in this visit.Show matched requests
Context
This GPC comparison supports no comparable delta
The pair did not record the network egress region for both visits, and an unrecorded condition never counts as matching. and The variant visit did not completely capture this evidence family, so its values are unavailable or incomplete rather than comparable totals.
The raw request logs of both visits remain below for transparency, but the diff between them supports no claim about what the compared condition changed.
2 disqualifying conditions named by the report's claim policy.
Worth checking
Consent tooling and requests to tracking-service entities appeared before any choice
cvs.com sent a request to OneTrust, a consent management platform (the tooling that shows cookie banners), and the request log included 5 distinct catalogued tracking-related services before the scanner made any consent choice; 5 companies answered.
A request to the platform's loader proves the page attempted to fetch consent tooling; an observed response supports delivery, but neither fact proves a banner was visibly shown to this scanner. Banner display can vary by region and visit context. The scanner never clicks a banner in this mode, so this report records requests made before the scanner made a consent choice. It does not determine whether any request required consent or whether the site's behavior complied with applicable law. More tracking-service entities or requests may appear after "Accept" than this report captures, so the counts here are lower bounds for users who consent.
Consent platform detected via a request to cdn.cookielaw.org.
Context
Tracking companies the privacy policy does not appear to name
Google, Tealium and Microsoft, plus 2 others were sent requests during this visit, but the policy text matched none of the names this scan knows those companies by.
Policies often disclose vendor categories rather than company names, so an unnamed vendor is a transparency gap worth reviewing, not automatically a violation.
Policy at https://www.cvs.com/{seg}/help/{seg}; 0 checkable statements matched; 0 of 5 observed tracking companies named in the policy.
Worth checking
Catalogued service domains recorded responses during this visit
Google, Tealium and Microsoft, plus 2 others appeared in the request log.
A catalog match identifies a maintainer-reviewed service/domain mapping; it does not establish why an individual request occurred, what it carried, or whether profiling happened. Functional catalog labels include advertising, analytics / tag management and tag management / customer data. This scan could not identify 10 of the 29 third-party hosts recorded here, so it cannot say who operates them. That is a limit of identity coverage, not evidence about the site.
121 cross-site requests across 29 third-party hosts.At or above the 75th-percentile mark for third-party domains across the 54 sites measured for this metric.Show third-party requests
Context
Requests were dispatched to catalogued major-platform domains
This visit dispatched requests to catalogued domains for Google and Microsoft.
The domain matches identify services, not the requests' purpose, payload, or whether any profile linking occurred.
The scanner observed cookie metadata whose domain crossed the scanned site's registrable-domain boundary. This report does not retain cookie values or partition keys, so it does not establish whether a cookie was a persistent identifier or could recognize a visitor across sites.
136 cookies total in this report.At or above the median for third-party cookies across the 54 sites measured for this metric.
Context
Fingerprint-like browser APIs were called
At least 1 retained high-entropy API call appeared in the incomplete instrumentation log.
These calls can be legitimate (charts, graphics, media), so the count is observational, not a severity score, and it excludes Web and Service Workers. Top calls: webgl.getParameter.UNMASKED_RENDERER_WEBGL.
Retained incomplete evidence includes 1 API event record; no exact API-family total is available.
Raw evidence
Open the interactive evidence explorer
The findings above are built from the stored report. Load the request rows, domains, cookies, storage keys, browser signals, visit phases, charts and CSV export when you want to check them; the versioned report JSON is always available below without this interface.
This versioned report is currently retained in the public corpus. Follow the currently retained site history, repeat the same public route when it is available, or request a transparent evidence correction.
cut short: fingerprinting evidence was censored before completion — the in-page fingerprint observer did not finish (recorded loss count: 1); recorded by the scanner
cut short: request evidence was censored before completion — the producer recorded an additional collection loss (recorded loss count: 2); fingerprinting evidence was censored before completion — the in-page fingerprint observer did not finish (recorded loss count: 1); recorded by the scanner
Recorded provenance is self-reported measurement metadata, not a cryptographic attestation. The public versioned report JSON contains the retained public evidence; see the methodology for interpretation and retention limits.
This report covers what the scanner measures, not everything a site can do. 16 browser surfaces are not instrumented at all (Every page except the one that was scanned; Anything that only loads after scrolling or interaction; Why a request happened, as a causal chain; and 13 others), 3 capabilities are declined by policy, and 3 are outside what any single visit can see. Their absence from this report is not evidence that they did not occur. Read the published coverage boundary.
Detector accuracy is unmeasured. No calibration study currently publishes a precision or recall for the detectors on this page, so a detector match here is a recorded observation, not a calibrated classification. How detector accuracy is measured.
Approved use boundary: This report is investigative evidence that requires independent corroboration. It is not a standalone legal determination and not the sole exhibit in a legal proceeding. Recorded in this project's release manifest on .