scholastic.com contacted catalogued LinkedIn, Google and Pinterest, +1 more domains during this visit.
7 distinct catalogued tracking-service entities recorded responses across 18 cross-site domains. A catalog match identifies the service domain, not why the request occurred or what it carried. It also looks like keyboard-input listeners were registered through a call chain that included a cross-site script.
The scan observed signals a non-expert should not have to decode from raw request tables.
The cards below translate the evidence into plain language. Where a measured distribution exists, severity ranks this visit against percentiles from the report's exact schema, methodology, tracker-catalog, ServiceRole-taxonomy, metric-contract, producer, and Global Privacy Control cohort, with each percentile card naming its metric-specific measured-site denominator (among 99 sites with a successful load across all cohorts; other methodologies, request-capped visits, and post-choice consent visits are excluded from this denominator, while failed or block-page attempts are outside that coverage), a curated set of popular, mostly commercial sites, not a random sample of the web, and otherwise uses fixed reference thresholds. The request log, domain table, and methodology remain below for verification.
146 requests observed in one controlled visit.
Worth checking
34 of 140 requests the engine evaluated matched Brave Shields filter lists
34 requests matched the default filter lists of Brave Shields, the ad and tracker blocker built into the Brave browser, while loading normally.
Computed with Brave's own ad-block engine and default filter lists in classification mode: matched requests were not blocked by the scanner and remain in this report's observed request counts. Matching shows what Shields would target on this visit's traffic; an actual Shields visit blocks these and also prevents their follow-on requests, so this number is neither a measured block count nor the total effect.
The hand-curated service catalog separately matched 31 request rows in this visit.Show matched requests
Context
This GPC comparison supports no comparable delta
The pair did not record the network egress region for both visits, and an unrecorded condition never counts as matching.
The raw request logs of both visits remain below for transparency, but the diff between them supports no claim about what the compared condition changed.
1 disqualifying condition named by the report's claim policy.
Worth checking
1 first-party DNS alias matched tracking checks
Recorded DNS aliases resolve to catalogued tracking-related services: Adobe.
The scanner followed DNS CNAME chains from first-party subdomains and checked resolved targets against the service catalog and Brave filter lists. These matches do not establish a request's purpose, profiling, or an intent to conceal tracking. A filter-list match alone is not a verified service identity or proof of tracking.
Consent tooling and requests to tracking-service entities appeared before any choice
scholastic.com sent a request to OneTrust, a consent management platform (the tooling that shows cookie banners), and the request log included 7 distinct catalogued tracking-related services before the scanner made any consent choice; 7 companies answered.
A request to the platform's loader proves the page attempted to fetch consent tooling; an observed response supports delivery, but neither fact proves a banner was visibly shown to this scanner. Banner display can vary by region and visit context. The scanner never clicks a banner in this mode, so this report records requests made before the scanner made a consent choice. It does not determine whether any request required consent or whether the site's behavior complied with applicable law. More tracking-service entities or requests may appear after "Accept" than this report captures, so the counts here are lower bounds for users who consent.
Consent platform detected via a request to cdn.cookielaw.org.
Context
Tracking companies the privacy policy does not appear to name
LinkedIn, Pinterest and Cloudflare were sent requests during this visit, but the policy text matched none of the names this scan knows those companies by.
Policies often disclose vendor categories rather than company names, so an unnamed vendor is a transparency gap worth reviewing, not automatically a violation. Named in the policy: Adobe, Google and Meta, plus 1 other.
Policy at https://www.scholastic.com/{seg}/{seg}/{seg}; 0 checkable statements matched; 4 of 7 observed tracking companies named in the policy.
Worth checking
Catalogued service domains recorded responses during this visit
Adobe, LinkedIn and Google, plus 4 others appeared in the request log.
A catalog match identifies a maintainer-reviewed service/domain mapping; it does not establish why an individual request occurred, what it carried, or whether profiling happened. Functional catalog labels include analytics / advertising, social / advertising pixel and analytics / tag management. This scan could not identify 2 of the 18 third-party hosts recorded here, so it cannot say who operates them. That is a limit of identity coverage, not evidence about the site. Catalog labels include session-replay or behavior-analytics services: Mouseflow; the domain match alone does not prove that a recording occurred.
The scanner observed cookie metadata whose domain crossed the scanned site's registrable-domain boundary. This report does not retain cookie values or partition keys, so it does not establish whether a cookie was a persistent identifier or could recognize a visitor across sites.
28 cookies total in this report.At or above the median for third-party cookies across the 54 sites measured for this metric.
Worth checking
Input-monitoring signal involving a third-party script
Listener coverage that could observe typing-related input events was registered through call chains that included a third-party script.
This is a behavioral instrumentation signal from listener registration, stack-attributed script origins, and known-vendor requests: it shows the page was instrumented to observe interaction, not that anything was transmitted. Stack attribution records the script origins present in the bounded registration call chain; a cross-site origin in that chain does not by itself establish that the cross-site script registered the listener, because first-party code can register its own listeners through a helper served from elsewhere. A different registrable domain is also not by itself a different operator: sites commonly serve their own scripts from a separate asset domain, so the card says third party only when the catalog or reviewed ownership attributes an origin to another organization. On scanners that run the active keystroke-capture probe, actual transmission is tested separately (a synthetic value is typed, never real input, and no typed values are collected); treat this card as a review prompt rather than proof.
31 interaction-listener registrations with https://assets.adobedtm.com/, https://cdn.cookielaw.org/ and https://cdn.mouseflow.com/, plus 4 others in the registration call chain, 7 input-listener registrations with https://cdn.cookielaw.org/, https://*.pinimg.com/ and https://static.cloudflareinsights.com/, plus 1 other in the registration call chain and known session-replay vendor(s): Mouseflow
Context
Fingerprint-like browser APIs were called
1 high-entropy API call appeared in the instrumentation log.
These calls can be legitimate (charts, graphics, media), so the count is observational, not a severity score, and it excludes Web and Service Workers. Top calls: webgl.getParameter.UNMASKED_RENDERER_WEBGL.
1 API family recorded.
Raw evidence
Open the interactive evidence explorer
The findings above are built from the stored report. Load the request rows, domains, cookies, storage keys, browser signals, visit phases, charts and CSV export when you want to check them; the versioned report JSON is always available below without this interface.
This versioned report is currently retained in the public corpus. Follow the currently retained site history, repeat the same public route when it is available, or request a transparent evidence correction.
Recorded provenance is self-reported measurement metadata, not a cryptographic attestation. The public versioned report JSON contains the retained public evidence; see the methodology for interpretation and retention limits.
This report covers what the scanner measures, not everything a site can do. 17 browser surfaces are not instrumented at all (Every page except the one that was scanned; Anything that only loads after scrolling or interaction; Why a request happened, as a causal chain; and 14 others), 3 capabilities are declined by policy, and 3 are outside what any single visit can see. Their absence from this report is not evidence that they did not occur. Read the published coverage boundary.
Detector accuracy is unmeasured. No calibration study currently publishes a precision or recall for the detectors on this page, so a detector match here is a recorded observation, not a calibrated classification. How detector accuracy is measured.
Approved use boundary: This report is investigative evidence that requires independent corroboration. It is not a standalone legal determination and not the sole exhibit in a legal proceeding. Recorded in this project's release manifest on .