SBL-CORR-2026-001: The historical input-probe disclosure overstates coverage. Unload-only transmissions were not reliably recorded. Focus and blur handlers could run, and per-field failures were not fully counted. These reports cannot establish absence of input transmission outside their retained observations.
SBL-CORR-2026-005: In these reports the privacy-policy cross-check read a privacy hub, a page that links to the site's policy without containing it, as the policy itself. Company names were matched only against that page, so the card listing tracking companies the policy does not appear to name is not evidence that the policy omits them, and the policy may name them. Requests and other observations are unaffected. Consult all clarification events for this report.
Catalogued servicesat least 25 retained requests2 names: Adobe 21, Google 4
0000000000000000000000000
Hosts the catalog does not nameat least 42 retained requests12 hosts; the catalog cannot say who operates them
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Not measuredabsence here is not evidence of absence
Other pages on this site
Signed-in visitors, other browsers and other regions
Anything that loads only after interaction or consent
Services the catalog does not name
Checks with incomplete evidence
one request on record, same site
one request on record, cross-site
the count is a lower bound; more may exist
not measured
4 distinct catalogued tracking-service entities recorded responses across 35 cross-site domains. A catalog match identifies the service domain, not why the request occurred or what it carried. SBL-CORR-2026-005: In these reports the privacy-policy cross-check read a privacy hub, a page that links to the site's policy without containing it, as the policy itself. Company names were matched only against that page, so the card listing tracking companies the policy does not appear to name is not evidence that the policy omits them, and the policy may name them. Requests and other observations are unaffected. Consult all clarification events for this report.
Bottom line: this visit has signals worth checking
The scan observed signals a non-expert should not have to decode from raw request tables. Some detector evidence was incomplete; each affected detector card states its own retained or unavailable scope, while completed request, cookie, and storage measurements keep their recorded exactness.
Where severity is ranked, the cohort is a curated set of popular, mostly commercial sites, not a random sample of the web.Details
The cards below translate the evidence into plain language. Where a measured distribution exists, severity ranks this visit against percentiles from this report's cohort, with each percentile card naming its metric-specific measured-site denominator; otherwise it uses fixed reference thresholds. That cohort is drawn from a curated set of popular, mostly commercial sites, not a random sample of the web. The request log, domain table, and methodology remain below for verification.
212 requests observed in one controlled visit.
What was checked
Page
https://www.walgreens.com/
When
Aug 14, 2026, 7:02 PM UTC
Setup
Both visits used headless Chromium in a desktop window of 1440 × 980, with en-US language and UTC time zone. Both ran from a scanner host the report does not name; the network region was not recorded.
Visits
Two visits configured to differ in the Global Privacy Control (GPC) signal: GPC off and GPC on.
Interactions
Typed a made-up test value into 1 form field in each visit, never submitting the form. No scrolling, clicking or consent interaction.
Outcome
Both visits completed, but some evidence was cut short.
What these visits could not see
Other pages on this site. Only the requested page's activity was recorded. The privacy policy was opened only to read its text, and none of its activity was recorded.
Signed-in visitors, other browsers and other regions. Both visits were automated, from a fixed en-US / UTC profile. Sites can behave differently for real users, browsers, regions, accounts, or network locations.
Anything that loads only after interaction or consent. Trackers that load that late are not observed, so counts are a lower bound.
Services the catalog does not name. Service labels use a US-biased hand-curated catalog, so regional services may be under-labeled.
Checks with incomplete evidence. In both visits: the privacy policy check, fingerprinting and session-recording signals. In the GPC on visit only: Brave Shields matches, the consent banner, third-party services, named platforms, Google Analytics remarketing and advertising pixels. Each linked card states what was retained.
Worth checking
22 of 160 requests the engine evaluated matched Brave Shields filter lists
22 requests matched the default filter lists of Brave Shields, the ad and tracker blocker built into the Brave browser, while loading normally.
Blocking can also prevent follow-on requests, so this number is neither a measured block count nor what a Brave visit would block.Details
Computed with Brave's own ad-block engine and default filter lists in classification mode: matched requests were not blocked by the scanner and remain in this report's observed request counts. This is Site Behavior Lab's list-based simulation, which applies every list to the site's own requests too. Brave's default Standard setting skips most of these lists for such requests, so its results can differ.
The hand-curated service catalog separately matched 50 request rows in this visit.Show matched requests
Context
This GPC comparison supports no comparable delta
The pair did not record the network egress region for both visits, and an unrecorded condition never counts as matching. The variant visit did not completely capture this evidence family, so its values are unavailable or incomplete rather than comparable totals.
The raw request logs of both visits remain below for transparency, but the diff between them supports no claim about what the compared condition changed.
2 disqualifying conditions named by the report's claim policy.
Worth checking
2 first-party DNS aliases matched tracking checks
Recorded DNS aliases resolve to catalogued tracking-related services: Adobe.
These matches do not establish a request's purpose, profiling, or an intent to conceal tracking.Details
The scanner followed DNS CNAME chains from first-party subdomains and checked resolved targets against the service catalog and Brave filter lists. A filter-list match alone is not a verified service identity or proof of tracking.
DNS alias: *.walgreens.com → *.*.omtrdc.net (Adobe; catalog match). DNS alias: *.walgreens.com → *.*.*.*.*.omtrdc.net (Adobe; catalog match).Open domain evidence
Worth checking
Consent tooling and requests to tracking-service entities appeared before any choice
walgreens.com sent a request to OneTrust, a consent management platform (the tooling that shows cookie banners). The request log included 4 distinct catalogued tracking-related services before the scanner made any consent choice; 4 companies answered.
It does not determine whether any request required consent or whether the site's behavior complied with applicable law.Details
A request to the platform's loader proves the page attempted to fetch consent tooling. An observed response supports delivery, but neither fact proves a banner was visibly shown to this scanner. Banner display can vary by region and visit context. The scanner never clicks a banner in this mode, so this report records requests made before the scanner made a consent choice. More tracking-service entities or requests may appear after "Accept" than this report captures, so the counts here are lower bounds for users who consent.
Consent platform detected via a request to cdn.cookielaw.org.
Opens the request log at its catalog-matched rows, which include requests to the tracking-related services counted here; this visit never clicked the banner.
Context
Tracking companies the privacy policy does not appear to name
Google, Criteo and Microsoft were sent requests during this visit. However, the policy text matched none of the names this scan knows those companies by.
Policies often disclose vendor categories rather than company names, so an unnamed vendor is a transparency gap worth reviewing, not automatically a violation.Details
Named in the policy: Adobe.
Policy at https://www.walgreens.com/…; 0 checkable statements matched; 1 of 4 observed tracking companies named in the policy.
Opens the request log at its catalog-matched rows, which include the requests to the companies this card names.
Worth checking
Catalogued service domains recorded responses during this visit
Adobe, Google and Criteo, plus 1 other appeared in the request log.
A catalog match identifies a maintainer-reviewed service/domain mapping; it does not establish why an individual request occurred, what it carried, or whether profiling happened.Details
Functional catalog labels include analytics / advertising, advertising and analytics / tag management. This scan could not identify 21 of the 35 third-party hosts recorded here, so it cannot say who operates them. That is a limit of identity coverage, not evidence about the site.
Google Tag Manager loaded; a remarketing sync cannot be told from this report
This visit contacted Google Tag Manager and recorded no request to a Google Analytics collection host. It also recorded DoubleClick hosts whose names this report generalizes, the remarketing sync host's among them.
This report neither shows nor rules out the sync.Details
Tag Manager is a loader. It can fetch Google Analytics or other tags, or none; this report cannot tell which it fetched here. The sync goes to stats.g.doubleclick.net, and a published report writes that name the same way as DoubleClick's ad-serving hosts.
googletagmanager.com observed; no google-analytics.com or analytics.google.com request; DoubleClick hosts recorded under generalized names.Show catalog-matched requests
Context
Third-party cookies were present
3 third-party cookies showed up during the visit.
This report does not retain cookie values or partition keys, so it does not establish whether a cookie was a persistent identifier or could recognize a visitor across sites.Details
The scanner observed cookie metadata whose domain crossed the scanned site's registrable-domain boundary.
35 cookies total in this report.At or above the median for third-party cookies across the 51 sites measured for this metric.
Context
Incomplete evidence: No fingerprint-like API calls observed in retained evidence before collection stopped
The retained evidence holds no calls to the instrumented high-entropy browser APIs.
Evidence collection was cut short, so this covers only what was recorded before the cutoff.Details
This is an observation layer, not proof that fingerprinting is impossible.
Retained incomplete evidence includes 0 API event records; no exact API-family total is available.
Domain evidence
37 recorded domains
The busiest recorded domains of the GPC off visit, with role, request count, request start times and catalog match.
The findings above are built from the stored report. Load the request rows, domains, cookies, storage keys, browser signals, visit phases, charts and CSV export when you want to check them; the versioned report JSON is always available below without this interface.
This versioned report is currently retained in the public corpus. Follow the currently retained site history, repeat the same public route when it is available, or request a transparent evidence correction.
cut short: fingerprinting evidence was censored before completion: the in-page fingerprint observer did not finish (recorded loss count: 1); detector output evidence was censored before completion: the privacy-policy link search did not finish (recorded loss count: 1); recorded by the scanner
cut short: request evidence was censored before completion: the producer recorded an additional collection loss (recorded loss count: 1); fingerprinting evidence was censored before completion: the in-page fingerprint observer did not finish (recorded loss count: 1); detector output evidence was censored before completion: the privacy-policy link search did not finish (recorded loss count: 1); recorded by the scanner
Recorded provenance is self-reported measurement metadata, not a cryptographic attestation. The public versioned report JSON contains the retained public evidence; see the methodology for interpretation and retention limits.
This report covers what the scanner measures, not everything a site can do. 17 browser surfaces are not instrumented at all (Every page except the one that was scanned; Anything that only loads after scrolling or interaction; Why a request happened, as a causal chain; and 14 others), 3 capabilities are declined by policy, and 3 are outside what any single visit can see. Their absence from this report is not evidence that they did not occur. Read the published coverage boundary.
Detector accuracy is unmeasured. No calibration study currently publishes a precision or recall for the detectors on this page, so a detector match here is a recorded observation, not a calibrated classification. How detector accuracy is measured.
Severity percentiles come from this report's exact schema, methodology, tracker-catalog, ServiceRole-taxonomy, metric-contract, producer, and Global Privacy Control cohort. Each percentile card's measured sites are among 99 sites with a successful load across all cohorts. Other methodologies and post-choice consent visits are excluded from each card's denominator, while failed or block-page attempts are outside that coverage. Visits with capped or incomplete request evidence are left out of each mark. They tend to be the heaviest pages, so a mark can sit lower than the cohort's true mark.
Approved use boundary: This report is investigative evidence that requires independent corroboration. It is not a standalone legal determination and not the sole exhibit in a legal proceeding. Recorded in this project's release manifest on .